Errors in computing systems can cause abnormal behavior and degrade data integrity and system availability. Errors should be avoided especially in embedded systems for critical applications.
× for the value of k. We have demonstrated how to choose an optimal value of k for the transformation.
This paper shows that for integer programs, the transformation with k = -2 was the most desirable choice in six out of seven benchmark programs we simulated. It maximizes fault detection probability under the condition that data integrity is highest. For programs that use floating point numbers in the IEEE standard 754 format, we need two transformed programs: the first one with 
Introduction
Embedded computing systems are widely used in remote, critical and high-availability applications [1] [2], but errors in embedded systems can cause abnormal behavior and degrade system reliability, data integrity and availability. Fault avoidance techniques such as radiation hardening and shielding or hardware redundancy such as duplicated or triplicated modules have been the traditional approaches to meet reliability requirements. However, as Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) component microprocessors are widely used in System-On-Chip (SoC) designs in embedded systems, fault avoidance and hardware redundancy techniques are expensive. Radiation hardened processors are out-dated and slower compared to the state-of-art COTS processors. In the Stanford ARGOS project [3] , it was shown that the throughput of the COTS board was an order of magnitude higher than that of the radiationhardened board. On the other hand, hardware redundancy using COTS processors may require hardware modifications or design changes resulting in increased cost and design time. Software-Implemented
Hardware Fault Tolerance (SIHFT) is a low cost alternative to hardware fault tolerance techniques because it does not require any hardware modification and can be easily adopted to most hardware platforms. For example, in [4] , software redundancy techniques are described to achieve low cost fault tolerance in a robot controller. In [3] , it is shown that, in radiation environments, the reliability of COTS components can be enhanced by using SIHFT techniques for detecting, correcting, and recovering from errors without changing the hardware.
Error Detection by Data Diversity and Duplicated Instructions (ED 4 I) is a SIHFT technique that
detects both temporary and permanent faults by executing two "different" programs with the same functionality but with different data sets and comparing their outputs. Temporary faults that corrupt either of the two programs can be detected by comparing the results. These temporary faults include transient faults in the processor and bit-flips in memory. A bit-flip is an undesired change in the state of a memory cell, and single event upsets (SEUs) are one of the major sources of bit-flips [3] . For example, bit-flips in the code portion of the program during the program execution may change the behavior of the program and generate incorrect results; then, comparing the incorrect results (produced by the corrupted program) with the correct results (produced by uncorrupted program) will detect the bit-flip. If the faults corrupt the original and duplicate programs, we can still detect the faults by comparing the results as long as the two programs produce two different incorrect results. Our technique cannot detect the fault that causes one of the programs to fall into an infinite loop and never stop. In this case, software control flow checking [5] or a watchdog timer [6] can be added to our technique to detect control flow errors.
Several SIHFT techniques using time redundancy have been proposed. Those include assertions [7] , a watchdog task [8] , block entry exit checking and error capturing instructions [9] , but they can detect only temporary faults, not permanent faults. Software duplication techniques such as those in [10] can also detect temporary faults, but they cannot detect hardware permanent faults such as stuck-at faults because hardware faults corrupt the original and duplicate copies of a program in the same way and produce the same incorrect results. However, our technique can detect permanent faults in data paths in functional units by executing two programs with diverse data using different parts of the functional units and comparing the results. In this paper, we focus on detecting permanent faults, e.g., stuck-at faults in data paths.
Executing two different programs or duplicated instructions requires more memory and execution time resulting in memory and performance overhead. For example, in [11] , it is shown that executing duplicated instructions causes 89.3% execution time overhead, on average, when eight benchmark programs are executed on a R4400 MIPS processor. However, if we have enough memory and use a faster processor that can accommodate the software redundancy in embedded systems, our technique is a low-cost substitute for costly hardware fault tolerance techniques, which often require the modification of the entire system design. Our technique can even be applied to existing embedded systems in applications by re-compiling the program with ED The value of the factor k determines the hardware fault (such as stuck-at faults) detection capability of ED 4 I. It should satisfy two goals: the primary goal is to guarantee data integrity; that is, the probability that the two programs do not produce identical erroneous outputs. The secondary goal is to maximize the probability that the two programs produce different outputs for the same hardware fault so that error detection is possible (error detection probability). However, the factor k should not cause an overflow in the functional units. In order to determine the optimum value of k, we have developed an analysis technique based on the probabilistic modeling of logic networks [12] and a design diversity metric [13] . The diversity metric was used in [13] to quantify diversity among several designs. We use this metric to measure the diversity between the original and transformed programs.
We have implemented a preprocessor that automatically transforms a program to a new program based on the algorithm described in Appendix I.
Unlike previous data diversity techniques [14] [15] [16] that target software faults, this paper presents a new approach to data diversity for on-line hardware fault detection. Our contributions are: (1) devising an algorithm that transforms a program to a new program with diverse data, (2) quantifying diversity between programs using a metric that was previously developed for hardware diversity, (3) demonstrate how to choose an optimal value of k for the transformation. We discuss previous work in Sec.2 and present the program transformation algorithm in Sec.3. We present how to determine an optimal value of k in Sec.4 and show benchmark simulation results in Sec.5. We discuss how to handle overflow in Sec.6 and floating point numbers in Sec.7. Finally, conclusions are presented in Sec.8.
Previous Work
Design diversity was proposed in the fault tolerance literature as a technique for increasing the reliability of a system. Design diversity is defined as the independent generation of two or more different software or hardware elements to satisfy a given requirement [17] . The main objective of design diversity is to protect a redundant system from common-mode failures, which are failures that affect more than one module at the same time [18] . Design diversity also has been applied to software systems [19] . N version programming (NVP) [20] is one example of diversity in software. Design diversity in N version programming targets software design faults. In N version programming, different designers develop independent versions of a program to avoid common design errors. The Consensus recovery block technique [21] is a hybrid system combining NVP and recovery blocks: It is another example in which diversity is used in software. A variant of NVP, N self-checking programming, also employs the design diversity concept and is used in the Airbus A310 system [16] [22] .
In [23] [24], data diversity was proposed for detecting software faults. In [23] , input data in unused input space (input data that are not used during normal execution of the program) are used to detect faults in software, and in [24] , diverse data from replicated sensors are used to tolerate faults in software.
However, our technique, ED 4 I, is different from the previous software diversity or data diversity techniques. First, our target is not software design faults but hardware faults -both permanent and transient faults in the system. Second, while the previous techniques preserve the original program structure and apply diverse data in different or unused input domains of the original program, we transform a program to a new program in which the data are automatically diversified using a transformation algorithm presented in Sec.3.
In the transformed program, the values of all variables and constants are multiplied by the diversity factor k in our technique. This is similar to the AN code [25] However, this technique also requires special hardware for encoding and decoding of the redundant code.
Compared to this technique, our technique does not require any hardware modification and can be applied to programs easily during compilation.
Engel [29] suggests modifying the program so that all variables are negated. This is the same as using -1 for the value of k. However, our results show that the value of k = -1 is not the optimum value because for some functional units, data integrity is not guaranteed for k = -1. This will be shown in Sections 4 and 5. By contrast, our technique quantifies diversity and chooses the optimum diversity factor k (not limited to only -1) to maximize data integrity as well as fault detection capability. We describe the algorithm formally in Sec.3 and prove its correctness in Appendix I.
Program Transformation
This section presents a transformation algorithm that transforms a program (integer or floating point numbers) to a new program with diverse data. We will begin with definitions of terminologies, and then describe the transformation algorithm. Finally, we will show an example illustrating how the transformation is implemented. (1)
(where k⋅ S(n) is obtained by multiplying all elements in S(n) by k).
The condition in (1) tells us that the control flow in the two programs should be identical. The condition in (2) requires that all the variables in the transformed program are always k-multiples of those in the original program.
In the expression transformation, we build a parse tree for every expression in P, and produce a new expression by recursively transforming the parse tree. In the branching condition transformation, we examine the inequalities in the conditional statements and modify them according to the value of k. Then, the transformed program always satisfies the conditions stated in (1) We have assumed that the factor k is determined to cause no overflow when the transformed program is executed. However, we will also consider this overflow problem and present possible solutions in Sec.6. 
Determination of k
The factor k determines how diverse the transformed program is. This section considers how to choose an optimal value of k that maximizes the diversity of the transformed program. For this purpose, we have developed two metrics to measure the diversity of the transformed program: data integrity and fault detection probability. An optimal value of k is the value that satisfies two goals: the primary goal is to maximize the data integrity and the secondary goal is to maximize the fault detection probability. Data integrity is more important because it guarantees no undetected error. For any given program, we first analyze the data integrity and fault detection probability of each functional unit of the system for various values of k. Next, as described in Sec.4.6, we use these values to create an optimal value of k for the transformed program by looking at execution traces of the programs.
Section 4.1 presents a diversity metric we have adopted from [13] , in which a diversity metric for systems with redundant hardware has been developed. From Sec.4.2 to Sec. 4 .5, we analyze data integrity and fault detection probability in functional units: bus, adders, multipliers and dividers, and a shifter. In our analysis, we consider integers from -5 to 5 for the value of k. Integers whose absolute values are greater than 5 are not considered for k in this paper because they have higher probability of overflow than the values considered. The analyzed data integrity and fault detection probability for functional units will be used in the next section to determine the optimum value of k for benchmark programs using execution traces of the programs.
Diversity Metric: Fault Detection Probability & Data Integrity
Researchers have studied techniques to quantify diversity in multiple designs and which technique should be used to measure the diversity [30] [31]. They use random variables Π and X to represent arbitrary programs and arbitrary inputs, and the probability that Π fails on X is calculated. Our diversity metric is somewhat different because we need to compute the probability that a program fails due to a hardware fault in the system.
In our approach, fault detection probability and data integrity quantify diversity between two programs running on the same hardware. Suppose there are N h number of functional units in the system, and denote the jth functional unit as h j , 0 ≤ j < N h . Then, let us define: 
E i the subset of X that contains inputs producing incorrect outputs in h j E i ′ the subset of E i that contains inputs producing incorrect outputs that erroneously satisfy the relationship y′ = k⋅y in the presence of a fault f ij
Then, |E i − E′ i | is the number of incorrect outputs that have the relationship y′ ≠ k⋅y and detect the fault by mismatch.
Assuming inputs are equally likely, we define the fault detection probability in h j , C j (k), as:
Moreover, we define the data integrity probability in h j , D j (k), as:
where D j (k) represents the probability of guaranteed data integrity.
If we assume a uniform distribution for all faults,
where N f denotes the total number of faults in h j . 
The optimal value of k is the value that maximizes C(k) under the condition that D(k) is highest.
From Sec.4.2 to Sec.4.5, we derive C j (k) and D j (k) for various functional units; then, in Sec. 4.6, we show how to determine optimal values of k for each benchmark program.
Bus Signal Line
An M bit bus consists of M parallel signal paths. As shown in Fig. 4 .1, the source places an M bit signal x on the M bit bus. If the ith bit of the bus has a stuck-at fault, the destination may receive a corrupted x. If there is a parity bit on the bus, a single bit error can be detected by parity check. However, if there is no parity on the bus, the stuck-at fault on this bus can be detected by the ED 4 I technique.
If we put x of the original program and x′ (= kx) of the diverse program on the bus one after the other, the fault will affect x and x′ in different ways. If the fault modifies either x or x′, but not both, the relationship x′ = k⋅x in the destination will not be satisfied. On the other hand, if the fault modifies both x and x′, the relationship x′ = k⋅x in the destination may or may not be satisfied. If neither x nor x′ provoke the fault, the destination will receive correct values and also satisfy x′ = k⋅x. In this case, the fault does not corrupt the information.
If k is -1 or a power of 2, we can get closed form solutions for the data integrity and fault detection probability. The closed form solutions are derived in Appendix II and summarized in Table 1 . Table 2 shows the fault detection probability C j (k) and the data integrity probability D j (k) for different values of k in a 12 bit (M = 12) bus as an example. Simulation applying exhaustive input patterns in the presence of faults is used when k is not -1 nor a power of 2. In the table, negative numbers are represented in a 2's complement representation, which is widely used in most microprocessors. Table 2 . C j (k) and D j (k) in a 12 bit bus (M = 12). Equation (5) is used to calculate values. Assuming no overflow in x and x′, the data integrity is guaranteed, i.e., D j (k) = 1 as shown in Table 1 and Table 2 (handling overflow is discussed in detail in Sec.6).
In Table 2 , the highest fault detection probability occurs when k = -1. However, as we will see in later sections, the value -1 for k does not guarantee data integrity in adders and multipliers. On the other hand, C(k) is larger when |k| is 2 and 4 compared to the cases when |k| is an odd number such as 3 and 5.
Adder
An iterative network such as a ripple carry adder consists of multiple logic cells cascaded in series. Each all receives carries from a previous cell and inputs to this cell; then, it produces outputs and subsequently generates a carry to the next cell.
The regularity of the array helps us to calculate the fault detection probability when the multiplying factor k is 2 l , where l is an integer. Suppose one node of the cell s i has a stuck fault. If x is an output of the network, the ith bit of x may be corrupted. In the transformed program, if x′ = kx is the output of the array, the ith bit of x′ may be corrupted; however, this is equivalent to the i-lth bit of x being corrupted because x′ is an l bit shift of x. Therefore, we can calculate the probability of provoking the faults in two cells s i-l and s i , and get the probability of mismatch between x and x′, i.e., Pr{x′ ≠ kx}.
This section considers a ripple carry adder as an example of an iterative network. We analyze the probability that a signal changes from 0 to 1 and from 1 to 0 in each node in the adder and use the method in [9] to compute the probability of provoking the faults. For every single stuck-at fault f, we calculated the values of C j (k) and D j (k) using an analysis technique described in Appendix II. They are shown in Table 3 . For a non-iterative network such as a carry look-ahead adder, we calculated the values of C j (k) and D j (k) using exhaustive simulation of all possible input combinations with various values of k. The numbers are reported in Table 4 .
As shown in Table 3 and 4, we cannot achieve data integrity of 1 when k = -1; this explains why our technique is better than [29] in which all variables are negated (same as k = -1 in our technique). If k is -1, there are some faults in the adder that will not be detected. For example, suppose one of the XOR gate's output is stuck-at 0 in a full adder of the ith stage s i of the adder (Fig. 4.2 (a) ). If the input a is 2 i , and the other input b is 2 0 = 1, this fault cannot be detected as shown in Fig. 4.2 (b) . Due to the fault, a + b produces an incorrect output 1, and (-a) + (-b) also produces an incorrect output -1. Because the two outputs satisfy x′ = k⋅x, we cannot detect this fault by comparison of the two outputs using k = -1. From this observation, we can see that the value -1 is not suitable for k in terms of data integrity.
For the same absolute value of k, a negative k has higher fault detection probability than a positive k. Multiplying by an odd number such as 3 is not as efficient as multiplying by 2, which is just a one bit shifting operation. Therefore, we do not need to choose 3 for k, which is a more expensive operation than shifting by just one bit.
Among the values shown in the Tables 3 and 4 , k = -2 shows the highest fault detection probability under the condition that data integrity is 1. The maximum difference between the lowest value and the highest value is 0.108. 
Multiplier & Divider
Many different implementations for multipliers and dividers exist, and data integrity and fault detection probability depend on the particular design implementation. In this section, we consider a parallel array multiplier [32] , Wallace Tree multiplier [33] and a datapath of SRT divider [34] In a 12-bit array multiplier and 8-bit Wallace Tree multiplier as examples, we randomly selected a node in the multiplier and injected a stuck-at fault into the node. For example, there are 1176 nodes in the 12-bit array multiplier. We injected a stuck-at fault into a randomly selected node, applied exhaustive input patterns to the multiplier in the presence of a fault and repeated simulations 10 4 times. We show the result in Table 5 . This table shows the positive and negative values of k in the same column because the array multiplier treats negative number multiplication as a positive number multiplication after changing the sign of the negative numbers.
Although the results in Table 5 Similarly, we show the results of the divider in Table 5 . 
Shifter
Since multiplication or division by a power of 2 can be replaced by shifting operation, shifters are used frequently during program execution [32] . Because a multiplexer-based shifter as shown in Fig. 4 .4 [32] is widely used, we will take this design for our simulation.
In our simulation, we injected a stuck-at fault into a randomly selected node and applied exhaustive patterns to 16 bit shifter inputs. This simulation experiment was repeated for 10 4 times over 432 nodes in the shifter. The results are shown in Table 6 .
In this shifter implementation, Table 6 shows that the value of -1 for k has the highest fault detection probability with guaranteed data integrity. The maximum difference between the highest value and the lowest value is. 
Determination of k for benchmark programs
We have observed that in different functional units, we have different values of k that maximize the fault detection probability and data integrity. For example, the bus has the highest fault detection probability when k = -1, but the array multiplier has the highest fault detection probability when k = 4. Therefore, programs, such as matrix multiplication that use a multiplier extensively, will need 4 or -4 for the value of k to obtain the highest fault detection probability unless there is overflow. In addition, as shown in Sec.4.4, k = -1 is no help at all for detecting errors in the multiplier. However, for programs such as sorting that use memory buses heavily to communicate with memory for loading and storing data and do not use multipliers, -1 rather than 4 for the value of k will maximize the fault detection probability.
Hence, an execution trace of a program showing execution frequencies of each functional unit is necessary to determine the best k for a particular program.
We chose 7 benchmark programs from a public benchmark website [35] and obtained execution traces of them using a MIPS simulator ( Table 7 ). The simulator gives us the execution frequency of each functional unit when benchmark programs are executed. The first three entries (add/sub, multiplication, and shift) in the table represent the execution frequencies of instruction types that use an adder, a multiplier, and a shifter relatively. The fourth entry, a memory access type, is an operation that uses the memory bus. For a branch instruction type, we assume that a carry-look ahead adder is used. The rest of the instruction types such as handling status registers are included in the entry of the last row. In Table 8 and Table 9 , C(k) and D(k) are calculated from equation (6),
which uses the values of C j (k) and D j (k) from Table 1 to Table 6 .
An optimal value of k must satisfy the primary and the secondary goals. The primary goal is to maximize the data integrity and the secondary goal is to maximize the fault detection probability. Table 8 shows the values of k that satisfies the primary goal of maximizing data integrity. Those values are indicated by shaded entries in the table. Under the condition that this primary goal is satisfied, Table 9 shows the value of k that maximizes the fault detection probability (indicated by shaded entry in the table). Therefore, the value in the shaded entry in Table 9 is an optimum k for each benchmark program.
Although the highest fault detection probability occurs when k = -1 in six benchmark programs, the value of -1 is not a good choice for k because the data integrity is the lowest when k = -1. In those benchmark programs, -2 is the best choice for k because the fault detection probability is maximized (shaded entries in Table 9 ) under the condition that data integrity is the highest (shaded entries of Table   8 ). Table 9 . Fault detection probability C(k) calculated with various values of k in benchmark programs. Shaded areas indicate the highest fault detection probability under the condition that data integrity is the highest (shaded areas in Table 8 ). Table 10 . Optimum value of k determined for each benchmark programs.
During the execution of the six benchmark programs (I-sort, Q-sort, Lzw, Fib, Shuffle, and Hanoi), the most frequently used functional units are adders. A carry-look ahead adder and a ripple carry adder have the highest fault detection probability (under the condition that data integrity is highest) when k = -2; thus, k = -2 is also the optimum value for those programs. On the other hand, the matrix multiplication program extensively uses the multiplier more often than the other six benchmark programs.
Because the fault detection probability in the array multiplier is the highest when k = -4, the fault detection probability in the matrix program is the highest when k = -4.
Finally, Table 10 shows the optimum value of k for each benchmark program.
Simulation Results
In Sec.4, we determined the optimum value of k for each benchmark program by looking at the execution trace of the program. In this section, we will verify our choice of the optimum value of k by simulating the benchmark programs in a MIPS simulator. We built a MIPS simulator that reads an assembly program, executes instructions, and emulates the functional units at the gate level for a fault injection simulation. We injected a stuck-at fault into randomly selected node of the functional units and generated output patterns, which may be corrupted if the inputs provoke the fault. We generated two output patterns in each functional unit: one from the original program and the other from the transformed program. We compared their outputs, counted detected and undetected incorrect outputs, averaged them over all simulated single stuck-at faults, and finally obtained C(k) and D(k) of benchmark programs. Using the simulation results shown in Table 11 and Table 12 , we determine the optimum value of k in Table 13 .
The reader can verify that Table 13 is identical to Table 10 ; this demonstrates that our results in Sec.4 agree with the simulation results.
The numbers in Table 11 and Table 12 are slightly different from the numbers in Table 8 and Table 9 , in which we assume uniform probability of all numbers in the entire range of the inputs.
However, when we simulate benchmark programs in our MIPS simulator, we cannot assume uniform probability of actual inputs to the programs. For example, the sorting program in the simulation does not sort the entire range of integer numbers (from -2 31 to 2 31 ) available in a 32-bit machine. Instead, it sorts the numbers that are smaller than ten thousand. Thus, there are slight discrepancies between the expected probabilities and the values obtained from simulation. Table 12 . C(k) with various values of k simulated in benchmark programs. Shaded areas indicate the highest fault detection probability under the condition that data integrity is the highest (shaded areas in Table 11 ). Table 13 . Optimum value of k determined for each benchmark programs by simulation.
Handling Overflow
The primary cause of the overflow problem in the transformed program is that, after multiplication by k, the size of the resulting data may be too large to fit into the data word size of the processor. 
Floating Point Numbers
There are several ways that non-integers can be represented. Examples include using fixed point representation and using a pair of integers (a, b) to represent the fraction a/b. However, only floating point representation has gained widespread use [34] . In this floating point system, a computer word is divided into three parts: a sign, an exponent and a fraction. As an example, in the IEEE standard 754 of the data in the transformed program are not changed no matter whether we transform a program with the factor k or not; thus, we cannot guarantee data integrity if we have a stuck-at fault in the fraction part.
The first approach to change all bits in floating point numbers is to extract the sign, fraction, and exponent bits from floating point numbers and complement all bits [40] . However, extracting and merging bits require a high overhead in code size and execution time. For example, in MIPS R10000
processor, it takes three consecutive cycles to extract the sign, fraction, and exponent bits and two cycles to merge those bits; the execution time overhead is already over 400% only with extracting and merging bits.
The second approach is to find a value of k for the fraction (k f ) and the exponent (k exp ) separately and use those values to get the value of k. Detecting a fault in the exponent field requires two transformations with two values of k; thus, we need to execute the transformed program twice, and the execution time overhead of our technique is over 100% for floating point numbers compared to integer numbers. In addition, scaling up to double precision is necessary to avoid overflow in the exponent field of floating point numbers. Therefore, overall execution time overhead will be over 200%.
In this section, we consider the second approach because the transformation algorithm discussed in Sec.3 is also applicable to this approach, and it has a lower overhead than the first approach.
The value of k for fraction
Firstly, let us consider the fraction part. We choose k = k f = 2 3 for the fraction part because it satisfies the following criteria: (1) guaranteed data integrity in the fraction, (2) no underflow in the transformed program, and (3) low probability of overflow.
1) Guaranteed data integrity
Let us denote a floating point number x as
, where s is a sign, m is a mantissa, and b is an exponent. Note that the mantissa m is always 2 1 < ≤ m . Suppose stuck-at 1 occurs and affect the ith bit (from the most significant bit) of the fraction of the mantissa m; then, the stuck-at fault will add e = 2 -i to m if it is provoked.
i) In the original program
If we denote x e as a corrupted x by this stuck-at 1 fault, However, a mantissa cannot be greater than 2; thus, if 2
, the mantissa is right-shifted by 1 (divided by 2) and normalized. This normalization will add one to the exponent. In other words, The same stuck-at 1 fault corrupts the ith bit of the fraction of the mantissa and adds e = 2 -i as it did in the original program. If we denote x′ e as a corrupted x′ by this stuck-at 1 fault, We have to check if the value of x′ e is erroneously equal to the value of kx e . If the values are the same, the data integrity is not guaranteed. From (7), Similarly, we can prove that data integrity is also guaranteed when a stuck-at-0 fault occurs.
(2) No underflow
Since k > 1, we do not have an underflow in the floating point number of the transformed program.
(3) Low probability of overflow
When we multiply the data by k < 2, the exponent of the original data increases at most by one. If a maximum value of data is less than 
The value of k for exponent
Secondly, let us consider the value of k for the 8-bit exponent of the floating point number. We use two transformations to guarantee data integrity in the exponent. We choose k = k exp = When we multiply the original value by k, the exponent of k, i.e., k exp is added to the exponent of the original value. Thus, 10101010 2 is added to the exponent of the original data in the first transformation, and 01010101 2 is added to the exponent of the original data in the second transformation.
We will prove later that every bit of the exponent of the original value can be complemented either by the first transformation or by the second transformation. If every bit of the exponent field can be complemented in the transformed programs, a single stuck-at fault in the exponent field can be detected.
First, suppose a stuck-at fault is provoked and produced an error in the original program. Since every bit in the exponent can be complemented in the transformed programs, the stuck-at fault will not be provoked in at least one of the transformed programs. Thus, when we compare the corrupted value in the original program with the uncorrupted value in the transformed program, we can detect the error. Second, suppose the stuck-at fault is not provoked in the original program. Then, it will be provoked in at least one of the transformed programs and the data will be corrupted. We can detect the error by comparing the corrupted value with the uncorrupted value. Therefore, a single stuck-at fault in the exponent field can be detected. 
; thus, n + p will always produce a carry (2 h ) from
From i) and ii), b h for any even number 0 < h < N is always complemented by either p or q.
Similarly, we can prove that b h is always complemented by either p or q when 0 ≤ h < N is an odd number or zero. Therefore, every bit of n is always complemented by either p or q.
The value of k for floating point numbers
We , we analyzed the data integrity and the fault detection probability in the bus, CLA adder, and multiplier. We applied all possible binary input patterns to these functional units in the presence of a randomly selected fault and checked whether the fault was detected or not. We repeated simulations 10 4 times for each functional unit. Fig. 7 .2 shows the simulation results. In Fig. 7 .2, (a) shows that the data integrity of the fraction part is guaranteed in these functional units. In Fig. 7 .2 (b) for the exponent, we can see that the data integrity is guaranteed in the bus, but not in the CLA adder. If the CLA adder has a stuck-at fault in some of carry signal lines, we miss less than 3% of the injected faults. Also, note that the multiplier is not shown in (b) because exponent multiplication is not required in floating point addition, subtraction, multiplication and division.
The simulation results show that using data integrity is not guaranteed for 100%, but it is still higher than 97%. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented the ED 4 I technique, which is based on data diversity, for detecting hardware faults without any hardware modifications. Unlike previous techniques, our technique is a pure software method that can be easily implemented in any system. ED A parse tree T is built from an expression expr( it is also true that n′ = k⋅n in division. Therefore, transform(t) always returns t′ such that the value of the top node of t′ is always k-multiple of the top node of t.
Branching Condition Transformation
The branch statement compares two values (or expressions) and determines the control flow based on the comparison result. The expression in the branch statement has binary values: true or false. For example, if the expression in the branch statement is true, the branch is taken. If it is false, the branch is not taken.
The branch statement can be represented by a decision triangle as shown in Fig. I 
Program Transformation
If k⋅S(n)= S′(n) after n vertices (basic blocks) are executed, Theorem I.1 tells us that k⋅S(n+1) = S′(n+1) after one more vertex is executed. Also consider a branch statement s in P and the corresponding branch 
Appendix II
This section discusses how to get a closed form solution for an optimal value of k that maximizes fault detection probability under the condition that data integrity is maximized. We discuss a bus as an example. We can apply this technique to iterative networks.
An M bit bus consists of M parallel signal paths. As in Fig. 4 .1, the source places an M bit signal x on the M bit bus and transfers information to the destination. If the ith bit of the bus has a stuck fault, the destination may receive a corrupted value of x.
We can detect this fault by applying x of the original program and x′ (= kx) of the transformed program on the bus one after the other and comparing the received values [41] . If the fault corrupts either x and x′ in a different way at the destination after x and x′ are received , x′ = k⋅x will not be satisfied. If x and x′ does not provoke the fault, the destination receives the correct values and x′ = k⋅x is satisfied, i.e., the fault does not corrupt the information.
1) k = -1
In 2's complement representation, negating a number is equivalent to reversing all the bits until the first 1 .
Second, suppose the ith bit is s/1; then, the numbers except for the i+1th row can provoke the fault.
( ) If x′ is applied to the bus and the ith bit is corrupted, it could be seen as the same case as the i1th bit of x is corrupted and left shifted; so, the corrupted value is x′ = 2(x -2 i-1
Hence, if at least one of x and x′ is corrupted, k⋅x = x′ is not satisfied, so the comparison of two values will detect the fault. If neither of them is corrupted -both the (i-1)th and ith bit of x are zero -the fault (stuck-at-0) does not affect the output, and k⋅x = x′ is satisfied.
Theorem II.2. Assume that input x is randomly chosen with uniform probability and no overflow in the bus. If k = 2 and a stuck-at fault exists in a bus, we can detect the fault with the probability of ¾ and the data integrity for the bus is 1. and they can provoke the fault so that k⋅x = x′ is not satisfied. Similarly, s/1 fault is also provoked by the three of four possible combinations; therefore, if a stuck fault is present on the bus, Pr{k⋅x ≠ x′} = ¾, and with this probability, we can detect the fault by mismatch.
If the fault is not provoked, it does not change x or x′. Thus, k⋅x = x′ is satisfied. Therefore, the data integrity of x and x′ for the bus is:
1 -Pr{ k⋅x = x′, and both of x and x′ are corrupted in the same way} = 1 -0 = 1 
